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Abstract
Deep neural networks are vulnerable to noise-based
adversarial examples, which can mislead the net-
works by adding random-like noise. However,
such examples are hardly found in the real world
and easily perceived when thumping noises are
used to keep their high transferability across dif-
ferent models. In this paper, we identify a new
attacking method termed motion-based adversar-
ial blur attack (ABBA) that can generate visually
natural motion-blurred adversarial examples even
with relatively high perturbation, allowing much
better transferability than noise-based methods. To
this end, we first formulate the kernel-prediction-
based attack where an input image is convolved
with kernels in a pixel-wise way, and the mis-
classification capability is achieved by tuning the
kernel weights. To generate visually more natu-
ral and plausible examples, we further propose the
saliency-regularized adversarial kernel prediction
where the salient region serves as a moving object,
and the predicted kernel is regularized to achieve
naturally visual effects. Besides, the attack can be
further enhanced by adaptively tuning the transla-
tions of object and background. Extensive experi-
mental results on the NeurIPS’17 adversarial com-
petition dataset validate the effectiveness of ABBA
by considering various kernel sizes, translations,
and regions. Furthermore, we study the effects
of state-of-the-art GAN-based deblurring mecha-
nisms to our methods.
1 Introduction
To this date, deep learning empowered applications have per-
meated all aspects of our daily life from autonomous driving
/ ADAS which utilizes computer vision capabilities such as
object recognition / segmentation, scene understanding, and
3D point cloud processing, etc., to our everyday interactions
with smart devices using speech recognition, natural lan-
guage understanding, face / gesture recognition, etc. Together
with increasingly accessible labeled training data, faster par-
allel computing devices, and more sophisticated deep learn-
ing model designs by virtue of AutoML and neural architec-
Figure 1: Two adversarial examples of MIFGSM [Dong et al.,
2018], Gaussian Blur [Rauber, Brendel, and Bethge, 2017] and our
ABBA. MIFGSM produces apparent noise on all 3 cases. Gaussian
blur-based method loses most of the details carrying out the attack.
Our ABBA generates visually natural motion blur with high attack
success rate.
ture search (NAS), the deep learning based prediction models
are improving at an unprecedented fast pace.
However, perhaps one of the newly identified ‘Achilles’
heel’ of deep learning is the theoretically obtainable adversar-
ial examples. Take object recognition task for example, when
having access to the network parameters and architectures,
the perpetrator can perform white-box adversarial attack by
adding small noise perturbation to the input image. Such an
additive noise perturbation can be optimally obtained by sat-
isfying the adversarial objective, i.e., leading towards erro-
neous network output decision. Most commonly used white-
box adversarial attack methods including the basic iterative
method (BIM) [Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio, 2017], the
C&W method [Carlini and Wagner, 2017], the fast gradient
signed method (FGSM) [Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy,
2014], and the momentum iterative fast gradient sign method
(MI-FGSM), etc.
If the attacker is able to drastically alter the content of the
image, it is quite obvious that the network will easily output
erroneously. To account for a successful adversarial attack,
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the perturbation noise has to be small in magnitude as mea-
sure by the Lp-norm of the noise, and hopefully impercepti-
ble to human. Therefore, the catch is to maximize the attack
success rates while maintaining the stealth nature of the at-
tack noise. For this reason, current state-of-the-art adversar-
ial noises can only be obtained theoretically and rarely in nat-
ural environment, which does not yet pose imminent threat
to the camera systems. There has been some attempts [Ku-
rakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio, 2017] to physically fashion
adversarial examples such as by putting up stickers or printed
patterns on the stop sign, etc. Again, these artifacts for ad-
versarial attacks are unlikely to be found ‘naturally’ in the
real-world environment and during the natural image captur-
ing and processing steps.
In this work, we have proposed a new type of adversarial
attack, which is termed motion-based adversarial blur attack
(ABBA), that can generate visually natural and plausible mo-
tion blurred adversarial examples.
More specifically, we first formulate the kernel-prediction-
based attack where an input image is convolved with ker-
nels in a pixel-wise way, and the misclassification ability is
achieved by tuning the kernel weights. In order to generate
more natural and imperceptible examples, we further propose
the saliency-regularized adversarial kernel prediction where
the salient region serves as a moving object, and the predicted
kernel is regularized to achieve naturally visual effects. Be-
sides, the attack can be further enhanced by adaptively tun-
ing the translations of object and background. Such saliency-
regularized motion blur happens only locally and consistently
and although it has a larger perturbation magnitude within the
bound of an object, due to the blur effect, the overall image is
outstandingly visually realistic and indistinguishable from an
actual moving object captured by a slightly longer exposure,
a scenario that can actually happen in the real world.
We have showcased the effectiveness of the proposed
ABBA through extensive experiments, benchmarked against
various noise-based attacks on both attack success rates and
transferability. The contributions of this work can be briefly
summarized as follows. (1) To the best of our knowledge, this
is the very first attempt to investigate kernel-based adversar-
ial attack. (2) We have proposed a motion-based adversarial
blur attack as a new type of attack mode to be added to the
adversarial attack family. (3) In order to produce more visu-
ally plausible blur attack, we have introduced a saliency reg-
ularizer that forces consistent blur patterns within the bound-
ary of the objects (or background in some cases). (4) Under
established optimal settings of various baseline methods and
ours, the proposed method achieves better attack success rate
and transferability. (5) Furthermore, our proposed method
has showcased higher robustness against GAN-based deblur
mechanism, as compared to standard image motion blur.
Related Work: Since the inception of using adversar-
ial examples to attack a deep neural network both theoret-
ically [Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy, 2014] and phys-
ically [Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio, 2017], there has
been huge amount of research towards developing adversarial
attack and defense mechanisms. The basic iterative method
(BIM) [Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio, 2017], the C&W
method [Carlini and Wagner, 2017], the fast gradient signed
method (FGSM) [Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy, 2014],
and the momentum iterative fast gradient sign method (MI-
FGSM) [Dong et al., 2018], etc., are a few popular ones
among early adopters in the research community. Building
upon these ideas, researchers have been continuously push-
ing the envelope in many ways. For example, serious at-
tempts have been made to integrate momentum term into the
iterative process for the attacks [Dong et al., 2018]. By do-
ing so, the momentum can help stabilize the update direc-
tions which begets more transferable adversarial examples
and poses more threats to adversarially trained defense mech-
anism. More recently, [Dong et al., 2019] propose to opti-
mize the noise perturbation over an ensemble of translated
images, making the generated adversarial examples more ro-
bust against white-box models being attacked while achieving
better transferability.
Mainstream adversarial attack is an additive noise pattern
which is learnable given the model parameters under a white-
box setting. Perhaps the prevalence is partially due to the
fact that the adversarial noise with the ‘addition’ operation
is relatively straightforward to optimize for. Of course, there
are many other ways to alter a clean image beyond the ad-
dition operation which are all potential candidate for coming
up with new types of adversarial attack modes. One caveat of
additive noise attack is the lack of balance between being vi-
sually plausible and imperceptible while having high attack
success rate. Usually it has to sacrifice one for the other.
Researchers are looking beyond additive noise attack to seek
novel attack modes that strike a better balance between visual
plausibility and performance. For example, multiplicative at-
tack [Ye et al., 2019], deformation attack [Xiao et al., 2018;
Alaifari, Alberti, and Gauksson, 2019; Wang et al., 2019],
and semantic manipulation attack [Bhattad et al., 2020], etc.
We are proposing a new type of motion-based adversarial
blur attack that can generate visually natural and plausible
motion blurred adversarial examples. We draw inspirations
from kernel prediction work such as [Mildenhall et al., 2018;
Niklaus, Mai, and Liu, 2017a; Niklaus, Mai, and Liu, 2017b]
as well as motion blur generation [Brooks and Barron, 2019].
Technical details will be presented in the next section. Also,
one desired property of the proposed method is the immunity
or robustness against the SOTA deblurring techniques such as
[Kupyn et al., 2018; Kupyn et al., 2019]. In an effort to under-
stand blackbox network better, an image saliency paradigm
is proposed [Fong and Vedaldi, 2017] to learn where an al-
gorithm looks by discovering which parts of an image most
affect output score when perturbed in terms of Gaussian blur,
replacing the region with constant value and injecting noise.
The localization of blur region is done through adaptive itera-
tion whilst ours is saliency regularized which leads to visually
plausible motion blurred image. Perhaps the major difference
is that their Gaussian blur kernel is fixed while ours is learn-
able to maximally jeopardize the image recognition network.
2 Methodology
2.1 Additive-Perturbation-Based Attack
Let Xreal be a real example, e.g., images in the ImageNet
dataset, and y denotes its ground truth label. A classifier de-
Figure 2: From left to right: original image, adversarial examples
generated by our kernel-prediction-based attack and motion-based
adversarial blur attack (ABBA).
noted as f(X) : X → Y predicts the label of Xreal. An attack
method aims to generate an adversarial example denoted as
Xadv that can fool the classifier to predict an incorrect la-
bel with imperceptible perturbation. Existing attack methods
mainly focus on the additive adversarial perturbation that is
added to the real example to get
Xadv = g(Xreal, δ) = Xreal + δ, (1)
where δadv is generated by maximizing a loss function
J(Xadv, y) with an constrained term
arg max
δ
J(Xreal + δ, y) subject to ‖δ‖p ≤ , (2)
where p is the Lp norm and the L∞ norm is widely used.
As an optimization problem, the gradient descent method is
commonly employed to solve the problem and inspire sev-
eral successful attack methods, e.g., FGSM, BIM, MIFGSM,
DIM, TIMIFGSM, etc.
2.2 Kernel-Prediction-Based Attack
Besides the addition in Eq. (1), there are various techniques
can process images for different objectives, e.g., Gaussian fil-
ter for image denoising, Laplacian filter for image sharpen-
ing, and guided filter for edge-preserving smooth [He, Sun,
and Tang, 2013], which are all kernel-based techniques that
processes each pixel of the image with a hand-crafted or
guided kernel. In general, compared with the addition, the
kernel-based operation can realize more image processing
tasks via different kinds of kernels.
More recently, several works [Bako et al., 2017; Niklaus,
Mai, and Liu, 2017a; Niklaus, Mai, and Liu, 2017b] found
that the kernel weights can be carefully predicted for more ad-
vanced tasks with high performance, e.g., high quality nosie-
free rendering and video frame interpolation. Inspired by
these works, we propose the kernel-prediction-based attack.
Specifically, we process each pixel with a kernel
Xadvp = g(X
real
p ,kp,N (p)) =
∑
q∈N (p)
Xrealq kpq, (3)
where p denotes the pth pixel in Xadv or Xreal, N (p) is set
of N pixels in Xreal and p ∈ N (p). The kernel kp has the
size ofN and determines the weights ofN pixels inN (p). In
general, we have
∑
q∈N (p) kpq = 1 to ensure the generated
image lies within the respective neighborhood of the input
image and a softmax activation function is usually adopted
for this requirement [Bako et al., 2017].
To better understand Eq. (3), we discuss two simple cases:
1) when we let N (p) be a square neighborhood of the pixel
p and the kernel of each pixel is a fixed Gaussian kernel,
Xadv is the Gaussian-blurred Xreal. Similarly, we can ob-
tain defocus-blurred image with disk kernel. 2) when we set
max(kp) = kpp and ∀q, kpq 6= 0, the perturbation of Xadv
becomes more imperceptible as length of kp decreases.
To achieve high attack success rate, we need to optimize
all kernels, i.e., K = {kp}, according to the loss function of
image classification and a constrained term
arg max
K
J
({ ∑
q∈N (p)
Xrealq kpq
}
, y
)
(4)
subject to ∀p, ‖kp‖0 ≤ ,max(kp) = kpp.
We can calculate the gradient of the loss function with re-
spect to all kernels and realize the gradient-based whitebox
attack. As a result, the attack method can be integrated into
any gradient-based additive-perturbation attack methods, e.g.,
FGSM, BIM, MIFGSM, etc.
The kernel-prediction-based attack can obtain a signifi-
cantly high success rate on blackbox attacks, which, however,
leads to easily perceptible unnatural image, since the kernel
of each pixel is tuned independently and generate noise-like
perturbation. To reach the balance between high attack suc-
cess rate and natural visual effect, we propose to regularize
the kernels to produce visually natural motion blur via the
guidance of a visual saliency map.
2.3 Motion-Based Adversarial Blur Attack
Motion blur is a frequently occurring effect during image cap-
ture. We will first introduce how to generate visually natu-
ral motion-blurred adversarial examples by regularizing the
kernel-prediction-based attack. Then we further show the
workflow of our attack in Fig. 3 for better understanding.
Saliency-Regularized Adversarial Kernel Prediction
Motion blur is generated during the exposure time by inte-
grating the light from a moving object. To synthesize the mo-
tion blur, we should know where is the object and specify how
it moves.
To this end, given an image, we first use the state-of-the-art
saliency detection method, i.e., PoolNet [Liu et al., 2019], to
extract the salient object S from Xreal and assume it is mov-
ing at the time of capturing the image. The saliency map S is
a binary image and indicates the region of the salient object,
as shown in Fig. (3). We then specify translation transforma-
tions to the object and background, respectively, which are
denoted as T(Xreal  S, θo) and T(Xreal  (1− S), θb) that
are simplified as XS,θo and X1−S,θb where θo and θb are the
translation parameters. Since the motion blur is the integra-
tion of all light during the object moving process, we divide
the motion represented by θo and θb into N sub-motions to
simulate blur generation. The sub-motions are represented
by {i∆θo, |i ∈ [1, N ]} and {i∆θb, |i ∈ [1, N ]}. Then, we
redefine Eq. (3) as
Xadvp = g(X
real
p ,S,kp,N (p))
=
∑
q=N (p,i)
i∈ [1,N ]
(XS,i∆θoq +X
1−S,i∆θb
q )kpq, (5)
Figure 3: Pipeline of our motion-based adversarial blur attack, i.e., Eq. (5). First, We use the PoolNet [Liu et al., 2019] to extract the
salient object in the image and obtain the object and background regions. Then, the translation parameters θo and θb are divided to N
parts to simulate the motion process and generate N images with the Spatial Transformer Network [Jaderberg et al., 2015]. Finally, we get
the adversarial example by adding these images with adversarial kernels as weights for each pixel. The adversarial kernels and translation
parameters are tuned to realize effective whitebox attack by optimizing Eq. (6).  denotes the element-wise product.
whereN (p) contains the pth pixel in all translated examples.
Compared with the attack in Section 2.2, the perturbation am-
plitude is affected by the kernel and translation parameters.
We define the objective function as
argmax
K,θo,θb
J({
∑
q=N (p,i)
i∈ [1,N ]
(XS,i∆θoq +X
1−S,i∆θb
q )kpq}, y) (6)
subject to ∀p, ‖kp‖0 ≤ ,max(kp) = kpp
∀p, q,kp = kq, if S(p) = S(q), ‖θo‖∞ ≤ θ, ‖θb‖∞ ≤ θ.
where θ controls the maximum translations of the object
/ background and is upper bounded by θw where w is the
dimension of the input image. Here, we use the spatial trans-
former network [Jaderberg et al., 2015] to realize translation
according to θo and θb, enabling the gradient propagate to all
kernels. There are two main differences about the constrained
terms c.f . Eq. (4): 1) The translation parameters are added to
guide the generation of the adversarial example. 2) The ker-
nels are set to be the same within the same region, which is
needed to generate visually natural motion blur, since pixels
in the object region usually have the same motion.
Attacking Algorithm
In this section, we summarize the workflow of the attacking
algorithm which is shown in Fig. 3. Given an image, we first
calculate its saliency map via PoolNet and obtain S. Then,
we initialize θo = θb = 0 and set all kernels kp by {kpp =
1, kpq = 0|∀q ∈ N (p), q 6= p} which makes Xadvt=0 = Xreal.
The attack method can be integrated into any gradient-
based additive-perturbation attack methods, e.g., FGSM,
BIM, MIFGSM, etc. In this work, we not only show the
effectiveness of the attack but also evaluate the transfer-
ability across models. Hence, we equip our method in
MIFGSM which is more effective in achieving high trans-
ferability across models. The gradient ∇XJ(Xadvt , y) is
calculated from the current image Xadvt . Then, we propa-
gate the gradient through the spatial transformer network and
obtain the gradient {∇kpJ(Xadvt , y)}, ∇θoJ(Xadvt , y) and
∇θbJ(Xadvt , y). The kernel and translation parameters are
updated for realizing iteration attack. In the following ex-
perimental parts, we implement our methods by setting the
hyper-parameters in Eq. (6) as θ = 0.4 with the iteration 10
and step size 0.04. We fix the kernel size to be 15.0. We will
discuss the effect of these parameters in the next section.
3 Experimental Results
In this section, we conduct extensive experiments to demon-
strate the effectiveness of the proposed method and cover the
following research questions: RQ1: How do the kernel sizes,
translations, motion directions, and blur regions affect the at-
tacking success rate? RQ2: If the transferability of the pro-
posed method across models is better than state-of-the-art at-
tack methods and why? RQ3: As a blurring method, if state-
of-the-art deblurring methods could defend it easily?
3.1 Experimental Settings
Dataset and Models: We use NeurIPS’17 adversarial com-
petition dataset [Kurakin et al., 2018], compatible with Im-
ageNet, to conduct all experiments. To validate the trans-
ferability of proposed method, we consider four normally
trained models, i.e., Inception v3 (Inc-v3) [Szegedy et al.,
2016], Inception v4 (Inc-v4), Inception ResNet v2 (IncRes-
v2) [Szegedy et al., 2017], and Xception [Chollet, 2017].
In addition, we also compare on four defense models: Inc-
v3ens3, Inc-v3ens4, and IncRes-v2ens from [Trame`r et al.,
2018] and high-level representation guided denoiser (HGD)
[Liao et al., 2018] which is the rank 1 submission in
NeurIPS’17 defense competition. All adversarial examples
are generated from Inc-v3 treating it as a whitebox model.
Baselines: We consider two kinds of baselines. The first one
is additive-perturbation-based attacks, e.g., FGSM [Goodfel-
low, Shlens, and Szegedy, 2014], MIFGSM [Dong et al.,
2018], DIM [Xie et al., 2019a], TIMIFGSM [Dong et al.,
2019], and interpretation-based noise [Fong and Vedaldi,
2017]. The results of DIM and TIMIFGSM are cited from
[Dong et al., 2019], since we use the same dataset with them.
Figure 4: The success rate of ABBA w.r.t. the variation of both  and θ in Eq. (6) where  is within [5, 50] with step size 5 and θ is in [0, 1]
with step size 0.1.
The second kind contains three blur-based attacks includ-
ing the interpretation-based blur [Carlini and Wagner, 2017],
Gaussian blur [Rauber, Brendel, and Bethge, 2017] and De-
focus blur.
For the setup of hyperparameters of first group attacks, we
set the maximum perturbation to be  = 0.3 among all exper-
iments with pixel values in [0, 1] which is the default setup of
foolbox [Rauber, Brendel, and Bethge, 2017]. For iterative
attack methods, we set the iteration number to be 10 and step
size as 0.03. The weight decay factor for MIFGSM is set as
1.0. For blur-based baselines, we set the standard variation of
Gaussian blur and the kernel size of Defocus blur to be 15.0,
which is the same with our method for a fair comparison.
3.2 RQ1: Effect of Kernel Size, Translations,
Motion Direction and Blur Regions
Effect of blur kernel size and translations: we calculate the
success rate of our method with different  and θ in Eq. (6).
Specifically, we try  with the range [5, 50] and θ in [0, 1].
As shown in Fig. 4, the success rates for the whitebox and
blackbox attacks are gradually higher as the increase of  and
θ. The highest success rate is 94.8%, 68.5% 68.4%, and
72.1% on Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Xception, respec-
tively, when we set  = 1.0 and θ = 50.0. The success rate
becomes zero when  = 0.0 and θ = 5.0. We also visualize
adversarial examples of an image that has been successfully
attacked on all  > 0 and θ > 0. Clearly, as  and θ increase,
the visual effects of adversarial examples are gradually worse
and the perturbations are more ease to be perceived. Accord-
ing to numerous attacking on different images, we choose the
 = 15.0 and θ = 0.4 at the following experiments to bal-
ance the success rate and visual effects. Effect of motion
directions: we fix θ = 0.4 and  = 15.0 and tune the mo-
tion direction of object and background by setting different x-
axis and y-axis translations. For each object motion direction,
we calculate the mean and standard variation of the success
rates on different background moving directions. As shown
in Fig. 5 (B), the success rate gradually increases as the object
motion direction becomes larger in [10◦, 50◦] while decreas-
ing as the direction is smaller in [50◦, 70◦]. The success rate
variation has symmetrical trend in the range of [90◦, 170◦].
Such results are caused by the L∞ used for constraining the
translation where the motion direction is directly related to
the translation. For example, with the motion direction of
45◦ and the constraints of x-axis and y-axis translation θ,
the allowed translation of object is
√
2θ that is the maximum
allowed translation among different motion directions. As a
result, the success rate reach the highest value around 45◦.
Effect of blurred regions and importance of adaptive
translations: we construct five variants of our method: 1)
ABBApixel allows the kernel of each pixel to be tuned inde-
pendently and is a kind of kernel-prediction-based attack de-
fined in Eq. (3) and (4). 2) ABBAobj only adds motion blur
to the object region by fixing the kernels of background pix-
els to be {kpp = 1, kpq = 0|S(p) = 0, q ∈ N (p), q 6= p}.
3) ABBAbg only adds motion blur to the background region
by fixing the kernels of object pixels to be {kpp = 1, kpq =
0|S(p) = 1, q ∈ N (p), q 6= p}. 4) ABBAimage adds motion
blur to the whole image while forcing object and background
to share the kernels and translations. 5) ABBA is our final ver-
sion where the translations, i.e., θo, θb and kernels are jointly
tuned by optimizing Eq. (6).
As reported in Tab. 1 and cases shown in Fig. 5 (U),
ABBApixel gets the highest whitebox and blackbox success
rate among all variants, which, however, changes the orig-
inal image apparently and looks unnatural. ABBAobj and
ABBAbg have the worst success rate on all models although
they tend to generate visually natural motion blur. ABBAimage
and ABBA have good balance between the attack success rate
and visual effects. In particular, ABBA that jointly tunes the
object and background translations can obtain much better
transferability across normal trained and defense-based mod-
Figure 5: Up: two examples of ABBApixel, ABBAobj, ABBAbg, ABBAimage, and ABBA. Bottom: Success rates of our method with respect to the
object motion directions.
els. Note, when compared with the results using fixed motion
directions in Fig. 5 (B), ABBA has the highest success rate
among all motion direction, which further demonstrates that
adaptive translations help achieve effective attack.
3.3 RQ2: Comparison with Baselines
Attack results: The comparison results over baselines are
shown in Tab. 1. We discuss them in two aspects: 1) the
comparison with additive-perturbation-based attacks. 2) the
advantages over existing blur-based attacks.
For the first aspect, compared with early additive-
perturbation-based attacks, e.g., FGSM, MIFGSM, and
Interpnoise, our method ABBA achieves the highest success
rate on all blackbox models and defences models, which
demonstrate the higher transferability of ABBA over these
methods. We also compare them for attacking object or
background regions. Clearly, the success rates of all meth-
ods decrease significantly and the decreasing values of our
method are larger than others, which means our method re-
lies on more image information to realize effective attacking.
Compared with two state-of-the-art methods, i.e., DIM and
TIMIFGSM, ABBA has lower transferability when attacking
Inc-v4 and IncRes-v2 while having higher success rate than
DIM on all defence models and TIMIFGSM on Inc-v3env4
and IncRes-v2ens. Note, if we allow our method to tune ker-
nel for each pixel independently, our method, i.e., ABBApixel,
outperforms DIM and TIIMIFGSM on all defence models.
For the second aspect, ABBA gets higher success rate than
GaussBlur, DefocusBlur, and Interpblur on all models. The
high success rate is achieved by optimizing the pixel-wise
kernel with Eq. (6) while the kernels of the three baselines
are shared by all pixels and cannot be tuned.
Interpretable explanation of high transferability: We
modify the method in [Fong and Vedaldi, 2017] that gener-
ates an interpretable map for a classification model f(·) with a
given perturbation. Then, we observe that the transferability
of an adversarial example generated by an attack correlates
with the consistency of interpretable maps of different mod-
els. Specifically, given an adversarial example Xadv gener-
ated by an attack and the original image Xreal, we can calcu-
Figure 6: The left subfigure shows the interpretable maps of six
adversarial examples generated by FGSM, MIFGSM, and ABBA,
respectively, with four models. The right subfigure shows the trans-
ferability & consistency distributions of adversarial examples gen-
erated by the three attacks.
late an interpretable map Mf for f(·) by optimizing
arg min
Mf
fy(M
f Xadv + (1−Mf)Xreal) (7)
+ λ1‖Mf‖1 + λ2TV(Mf)
where fy(·) denotes the score at label y that is the ground
truth label of Xreal and TV(·) is the total-variation norm. In-
tuitively, optimizing Eq. (7) is to find the region that causes
misclassification. We optimize Eq. (7) via gradient decent in
150 iterations and fix λ1 = 0.05 and λ2 = 0.2.
We can calculate four interpretable maps for each adversar-
ial example base on four models, i.e., Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-
v2, and Xception, as shown in Fig. 6(L). We observe that
the interpretable maps of our method have similar distribu-
tions across the four models while the maps of FGSM and
MIFGSM do not exhibit this phenomenon. To further validate
this observation, we calculate the standard variation across
the four maps at each pixel and get a value by mean pool-
ing. We normalize the value and regard it as the consistency
measure for the four maps. As shown in Fig. 6(R), the con-
Table 1: Adversarial comparison results on NeurIPS’17 adversarial competition dataset according to the success rate. There are two compar-
ison groups. For the first one, we compare the effects of attacking different regions, i.e., object or background regions, of inputs for FGSM,
MIFGSM, GaussBlur, DefocusBlur, and our ABBA. In addition to above methods, the second group comparison contains Interpretation-based
blur (Interpblur), Interpretation-based noise (Interpnoise) [Fong and Vedaldi, 2017], DIM [Xie et al., 2019a], and TIMIFGSM [Dong et al.,
2019]. The results of DIM and TIMIFGSM are cited from [Dong et al., 2019] where the Xception model is not included. We highlight the
top three results with red , green , and blue , respectively.
Attacking results for adv. examples from Inc-v3 Defence results to adv. examples from Inc-v3
Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Xception Inc-v3env3 Inc-v3env4 IncRes-v2ens HGD
FGSM 90.1 20.7 13.8 26.6 18.3 16.1 11.5 8.2
FGSMobj 58.6 11.9 7.0 12.6 10.9 12.0 7.3 3.5
FGSMbg 63.7 11.4 6.9 13.5 12.2 12.9 7.6 2.7
MIFGSM 95.8 23.9 20.6 28.2 17.7 16.2 9.6 2.9
MIFGSMobj 81.3 11.8 7.4 11.5 11.1 12.3 6.1 1.8
MIFGSMbg 95.5 13.6 10.3 16.7 13.9 13.3 8.8 1.9
GaussBlur 34.7 22.7 18.4 26.1 23.6 23.8 19.3 16.9
GaussBlurobj 13.6 6.0 5.2 7.1 8.6 7.8 6.3 4.6
GaussBlurbg 18.8 10.8 9.2 12.0 13.0 13.1 10.9 8.7
DefocusBlur 30.0 16.8 11.1 18.8 17.5 18.3 15.0 12.9
DefocusBlurobj 10.0 3.0 2.9 3.6 5.2 4.6 3.8 2.7
DefocusBlurbg 16.9 9.2 7.0 10.5 10.1 10.3 9.2 7.8
ABBApixel 89.2 65.5 65.8 71.2 69.8 72.5 68.0 63.1
ABBAobj 21.0 4.9 4.2 7.0 10.1 10.5 8.3 4.9
ABBAbg 30.9 11.6 10.1 12.9 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.5
ABBAimage 62.4 29.8 28.8 34.1 43.2 43.8 38.9 28.4
ABBA 65.6 31.2 29.7 33.5 46.6 48.7 41.2 31.0
Interpblur 34.7 3.6 0.5 3.4 7.1 7.1 4.3 1.4
Interpnoise 95.8 20.5 15.6 22.9 16.8 16.1 9.4 3.3
DIM 98.3 73.8 67.8 - 35.8 35.1 25.8 25.7
TIMIFGSM 97.8 47.1 46.4 - 46.9 47.1 37.4 38.3
sistency of adversarial examples of our method is generally
higher than that of FGSM and MIFGSM.
We further study the transferability of an adversarial exam-
ple across models. Given an adversarial example from Inc-v3
and a model f(·), we calculate a score to measure the trans-
ferability under this model: tf = fc(Xadv)− fy(Xadv) where
c 6= y is the label having maximum score among non-ground-
truth labels. If tf > 0 means the adversarial example fool f(·)
successfully, and vice versa. As shown in Fig. 6(R), the trans-
ferability of adversarial examples of our method is generally
higher than that of FGSM and MIFGSM.
Base on the observations in Fig. 6(R), we conjecture that
higher consistency across models leads to higher transferabil-
ity. This is reasonable since the high consistency of inter-
pretable maps means the adversarial example has the same
effect to different models and the optimized perturbation on
the whitebox model can be easily transferred to other models.
3.4 RQ3: Effect of Deblurring Methods
Here, we discuss the effect of SOTA deblurring methods to
our adversarial examples and ‘normal’ motion blurred im-
ages. The ‘normal’ motion blur is usually synthesized by
averaging neighbouring video frames [Nah, Hyun Kim, and
Mu Lee, 2017], which is equivalent to set the kernel weights
as 1N to average the translated examples in Eq. (5). We can
regard such normal motion blur as an attack and add them
to all images in the testing data. The corresponding success
rate can be calculated. We use DeblurGAN [Kupyn et al.,
2018] and DeblurGANv2 [Kupyn et al., 2019] to handle our
adversarial examples and the normal motion blurred images
and calculate the relative decrease of the success rate, i.e.,
r = s−s
′
s where s and s
′ represent the success rate before and
after deblurring.
Smaller r means the attack is more robust to deblurring
methods. As shown in Fig. 7, in general, compared with the
normal motion blurred images, our adversarial examples are
harder to be handled by the state-of-the-art deblurring meth-
ods. For DeblurGANv2, the relative decrease r of normal
motion blur is usually larger than 0.5 when kernel size is in
[15, 35], which means DeblurGANv2 can effectively remove
the normal motion blur and improve the classification accu-
racy. In contrast, the r of our method is always smaller than
the r of normal motion blur and gradually decreases in the
range of [15, 35], which means it is more difficult to use De-
blurGANv2 to defend our attack as kernel size is larger. We
can find similar results on DeblurGAN where the difference
of r between our method and normal motion blur is much
smaller than that on DeblurGANv2. When kernel size equals
to 5 or 10 which leads the light motion blur, we usually have
r < 0 for the normal motion blur, which means deblurring
can improve its attack success rate and harm the image clas-
sification accuracy. Similar results are also observed in [Guo
et al., 2019a].
4 Conclusions
We have identified and investigated a new type of adversarial
attack mode based on motion blur, which is termed motion-
based adversarial blur attack (ABBA). We first propose the
kernel-prediction-based attack that processes each pixel with
Figure 7: The relative decrease of attack success rate before and after deblurring. Two state-of-the-art deblurring methods, i.e., Deblur-
GAN [Kupyn et al., 2018] and DeblurGANv2 [Kupyn et al., 2019], are used to deblur the our adversarial blurred examples and normal
motion blurred images.
a kernel that can be optimized by the supervision of the mis-
classification objective. Base on this, we further propose the
saliency-regularized adversarial kernel prediction to make the
motion blurred image visually more natural and plausible.
Our method has achieved high success rate and transferability
on blackbox and defense models with visually natural motion
blur on the NeurIPS’17 adversarial competition dataset.
In the future, we can adapt our method to other tasks, e.g.,
visual object tracking [Guo et al., 2019b; Guo et al., 2020;
Feng et al., 2019; Guo et al., 2017b; Guo et al., 2017a],
or other learning techniques, e.g., deep reinforcement learn-
ing [Sun et al., 2020]. In addition, this work may also help
uncover the disagreements or uncertainty of deep neural net-
works on different motion blur levels [Xie et al., 2019b;
Zhang et al., 2020].
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